Abstract-We study attribute-based regulations, under which regulatory compliance of a firm, product, or individual depends on a secondary attribute that is not the intended target of the regulation. We develop a theoretical model of the welfare consequences of attribute basing, including its distortionary costs and potential benefits. We then quantify these welfare consequences using quasi-experimental evidence from weight-based fuel economy regulations. We use bunching analysis to show that vehicle weight increased in response to regulation. We also leverage a policy change and develop a new method for analyzing double-notched policies to compare the costs and benefits of a specific attribute-based policy.
This paper investigates the welfare consequences of attribute-based regulations (ABR) as opposed to regulations based only on the targeted characteristic. Despite the ubiquity of attribute-based policies, the economics literature has not established theoretical and empirical frameworks for the analysis of this important class of policies. In this paper, we first develop a theoretical model that identifies the key parameters that determine the costs and benefits of attribute basing. We then explore two empirical methods that enable us to estimate those key parameters. Our empirical analysis exploits quasi-experiments in attribute-based Japanese fuel economy regulations, the features of which provide several empirical advantages for estimating the welfare effects of ABR.
In brief, we conclude that it is unlikely that attribute basing is justified on efficiency grounds. We identify conditions under which attribute basing has efficiency benefits, but these same benefits could be achieved through compliance trading schemes without incurring distortions associated with attribute basing. Attribute basing is an imperfect substitute for compliance trading, and it is justified only if there is some constraint that prevents trading. Instead, we suspect that many ABR's are motivated by distributional considerations. In this case, the distortions induced represent the cost of achieving redistribution.
We begin by establishing a simple theoretical model that facilitates the analysis of attribute-based regulations. The key cost of an ABR is that it creates an implicit incentive for market participants to manipulate the secondary attribute. We argue that this cost, and a variety of possible benefits, can be understood by thinking of the targeted characteristic and the secondary attribute as two distinct goods, the former of which causes an externality. In this framework, the insights and tools of traditional public finance immediately apply. Specifically, our first proposition establishes sufficient conditions under which attribute basing is purely distortionary, because a policy based only on the targeted characteristic can emulate a first-best Pigouvian tax. The resulting welfare loss from attribute basing in this situation is a Harberger triangle in the market for the secondary attribute, and thus the elasticity of the attribute with respect to implicit regulatory incentives is the pivotal parameter that determines the magnitude of welfare losses from ABR.
We then investigate a variety of possible benefits of ABR that might rationalize its use despite this cost. We focus on two possibilities, though we discuss several others. First, ABR can contribute to efficiency by equalizing the marginal costs of regulatory compliance across sources in certain settings. Some policies (including CAFE) have a compliance trading system, which means that the market as a whole 320 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS must meet the standard on average and the market for compliance credits will equalize marginal costs of compliance. Other policies (like energy-efficiency mandates for appliances) require each product to comply with a given standard. When each product must comply, marginal costs of compliance will vary across products. When the secondary attribute is correlated with compliance costs, an ABR can reduce the dispersion in marginal costs. This creates an efficiency benefit that must be weighed against the costs induced by distortions in the choice of the attribute. Our second proposition characterizes this trade-off. Taken together, our results imply that whether an ABR is preferable to a standard based only on the targeted characteristic will depend on the elasticity of the attribute with respect to regulatory incentives and the degree of marginal cost equalization that the ABR is able to achieve.
A second possibility is distribution. Attribute basing can achieve distributional goals when the planner wishes to shift welfare across consumers or producers based on the secondary attribute. In this case, the efficiency costs of ABR that are our focus represent the cost of achieving distributional goals. For example, size-based fuel economy regulations can be rationalized as a way of shifting welfare between firms that sell small vehicles and those that sell large vehicles (perhaps in order to favor domestic producers and their consumers). Our final proposition demonstrates conditions under which second-best policies will include attribute basing to achieve redistribution.
In the second part of our paper, we develop two complementary empirical methods that use quasi-experimental policy variation to identify key parameters necessary for assessing the costs and benefits of attribute basing. To do so, we analyze Japanese fuel economy regulations, under which firms making heavier cars are allowed to have lower fuel economy. The Japanese regulation offers two empirical advantages over data from other markets, including automobile markets in the EU and United Sates. First, the Japanese regulations have existed for more than three decades and have experienced several policy reforms. Second, the Japanese ABR is notched-the fuel economy required for a given vehicle is a decreasing step function of its weight. Automakers therefore have a large incentive to increase vehicle weight only up to key thresholds, where the mandated fuel economy drops discretely. These notches do not change the fundamental economic incentives at play, but they aid empirical identification. Our panel analysis differs from existing work in this area by considering a double notch (i.e., a notch in two coordinates), which is, to the best of our knowledge, new to the literature. 1 Our first empirical strategy is to test for bunching (excess mass) in the distribution of vehicle weight around regulatory thresholds, which belie a distortion in vehicle weight (the secondary attribute). We find stark evidence of weight manipulation. Qualitatively, this implies that vehicle weight 1 See Slemrod (2010) for a review.
is responsive to policy incentives, which, according to our theory, implies significant deadweight loss. To quantify this bunching, we use methods recently developed in the public finance literature. We estimate that 10% of Japanese vehicles have had their weight increased in response to the policy. Among the affected vehicles, we estimate that weight rose by 110 kilograms on average. This not only works against the goal of petroleum conservation (because heavier cars are less fuel efficient); it also exacerbates accident-related externalities (because heavier cars are more dangerous to nonoccupants). Our back-of-the-envelope estimate based on the value of a statistical life and estimates of the relationship between fatalities and vehicle weight suggests that this weight increase creates around $1 billion of deadweight loss per year in the Japanese car market. This should spark concern about the use of ABR not only in the substantial automobile market in Japan, with roughly 5 million units sold per year, but also for China (the world's largest car market), the EU, and India, all of which feature weight-based fuel economy regulations.
Our second empirical strategy involves estimating a model that enables us to study counterfactual policies and directly compare the costs and benefits of attribute basing. Our theory emphasizes that ABR can be beneficial in equalizing marginal costs of compliance, in particular for policies that require each individual product to comply with a standard. In such cases, the benefits of marginal cost equalization may outweigh costs from distorting the attribute. Such benefits are likely muted in the Japanese fuel economy regulations because they allow fleet averaging, but in 2009, the Japanese government introduced a model-specific (rather than corporate average) subsidy for vehicles that exceeded a more aggressive weight-based fuel economy threshold. This provides an ideal opportunity to use quasi-experimental variation and revealed preference data to estimate parameters necessary for directly comparing the efficiency benefits and distortionary costs of an ABR. Vehicles that are modified in order to become eligible for the subsidy reveal information about the relative costs of changing weight versus fuel economy. We construct panel data spanning the introduction of the subsidy and use them to estimate the compliance costs of modifying fuel economy and weight.
We use these estimates to evaluate three counterfactual policy scenarios: attribute-based fuel economy standards, a flat standard without compliance trading, and a flat standard with compliance trading. Consistent with the results of our model, when compliance trading is disallowed, attributebased standards improve efficiency as compared to a flat standard because attribute basing helps equalize marginal compliance costs. However, this benefit is partially offset by distortions in the attributes created by the regulatory incentive; the ABR results in weight increases, whereas a flat policy leads to weight reductions. Also consistent with our theory, we find that attribute basing is an imperfect substitute for compliance trading because marginal compliance costs are not perfectly correlated with the attribute, which results in only partial equalization of the marginal compliance costs. In our case, the ABR recovers only about half of the welfare gain that would be achieved by a flat standard with compliance trading.
Our paper contributes to several literatures. First, we contribute to the environmental economics literature on differentiated standards, of which attribute basing is an example. The prior literature has focused on vintage-differentiated standards (e.g., Gruenspecht, 1982; Nelson, Tietenberg, & Donihue, 1993; Stavins, 2006) or spatial differentiation (e.g., Mendelsohn, 1986; Becker & Henderson, 2000) . Consistent with our findings, the literature on spatial differentiation finds that such differentiation may be logical from a costeffective standpoint, but it may distort the location of economic activity. Similarly, the literature on vintage differentiation notes that differentiation can improve efficiency by equalizing marginal costs of compliance, but this comes at a cost of distorting the vintage distribution by affecting exit or entry. Parallel to our conclusions, the literature suggests that tradable permits may be a superior way to achieve these gains (see, e.g., Stavins, 2006) . Relative to this literature, our model offers a concise way of characterizing benefits and distortions, as well as optimal policies, in a unified welfare framework. We also extend the literature to consider differentiation in product characteristics like size.
Second, we contribute to the analysis of fuel economy policies. There is a substantial literature in this area, but few studies have considered attribute basing. Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012) use engineering estimates of design costs and a discrete-choice model to predict the manipulation of footprint in response to CAFE. Reynaert (2015) studies the rollout of fuel economy standards in the EU, which are weight based, using a structural model of the market. Relative to those papers, we provide revealed preference evidence of weight changes using quasi-experimental variation. Our paper is also the first to develop a full theoretical model of attribute basing, though Gillingham (2013) notes the potential implicit incentive for the expansion of footprint in a broader discussion of CAFE policies. Finally, Jacobsen (2013) addresses the safety impacts of footprint-based standards in the United States, which we discuss.
In sum, our paper demonstrates how ABR, which may at first appear quite different from a tax, can be analyzed with the tools of public economics-Pigouvian taxes, Harberger triangles, and the theory of the second best-to evaluate an important class of policies. For the policy we study, we find large unintended consequences, and we quantify the benefits of policy reform. Our paper has important implications for future research and policy because a growing number of countries are adopting attribute-based regulations in durable goods markets, including automobiles, electric appliances, solar panels, and buildings.
II. Theory
Our model setup is as follows. A consumer has unit demand for a durable good with two continuously varying characteristics a and e, the levels of which they choose. The present discounted benefit of services from the durable is F n (a n , e n ), where n = 1, . . . , N indexes a type of consumer whose tastes may vary. Consumers have exogenous income I n , which they spend on the durable and a quasi-linear numeraire x. The characteristic e generates an externality that is linear in the aggregate e consumed over all types, with marginal social benefit φ. The total externality is φ n e n . In our terminology, e is the targeted characteristic; a is the secondary attribute.
We model an attribute-based regulation as a mandate that requires e n ≥ σ(a n ). This mandate acts as a constraint on the consumer's optimization problem. When compliance trading is allowed, the mandate must be met by the market on average, but individual products can make up a compliance gap by purchasing credits. We generally work with a linear attribute-based regulation, which has e n ≥σa n + κ, wherê σ and κ are constants. Where we work with a more general function σ(a), we assume it is differentiable and includes a constant term κ. We call σ (a n ), which equalsσ for linear policies, the attribute slope.
We assume a perfectly competitive supply side with no fixed costs per variety. This means that consumers can choose any bundle of a and e and pay a price P(a, e) that is equal to the marginal cost of production C(a, e), which we assume is increasing and convex in both arguments. Our supply assumptions simplify the analysis and allow us to focus on the unique implications of attribute basing. There are no firm profits, and there is no distinction between changing the attributes of an existing product versus introducing a new variety. In our empirical application, we observe products made by firms, and to apply our model, we interpret changes in product characteristics as reflecting policy-induced shifts in consumer choices. The benefit is tractability and transparency, but the cost is that we do not account for the welfare consequences of policy-induced changes in firm market power.
Under marginal cost pricing, having substituted in the budget constraint, consumer n's Lagrangean is max a n ,e n U n = F n (a n , e n ) − C(a n , e n ) + I n + λ n (e n − σ(a n )),
where λ n is the shadow price of the regulation. The consumer ignores the externality when making choices.
The planner puts welfare weight θ n on the utility of type n, which includes the externality, where the mean of θ n is normalized to 1. The planner maximizes social welfare W by choosing the policy function σ(a n ):
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
At times, we make use of notation that writes the consumer's welfare loss from deviating from his or her private optimum as L n (e n − e 0 n , a n − a
, where a 0 n and e 0 n are the characteristics that type n would choose in the absence of any policy (i.e., their privately optimal bundle). We denote deviations from these private optima as Δa n ≡ a n − a 0 n and Δe n ≡ e n − e 0 n . In some cases, we assume a quadratic functional form of L n for illustration:
Our model makes several assumptions in the interest of simplicity, including perfect competition, perfect targeting of the externality, and unit demand for the durable. We discuss these issues further in section IID.
A. ABR Is an Imperfect Substitute for Compliance Trading
Some attribute-based regulations (including CAFE since 2012) have a compliance trading system through which firms that exceed the standard are given a credit for excess compliance that can be sold to another firm. Buyers can use credits to achieve compliance. If the market for permits is competitive, a trading system ensures that the marginal compliance cost, which will equal the equilibrium price of a compliance credit, is uniform across all firms and products. We first consider the implications of ABR in the presence of such a competitive compliance trading system.
When there is compliance trading, the potential benefit that ABR provides by equalizing marginal costs of compliance is obviated. Proposition 1 shows that optimal policy involves no attribute basing in this case: Proposition 1. Assume that there is competitive compliance trading. If welfare weights are uniform (θ n = 1 ∀n), the optimal policy involves no attribute basing. The optimal attribute slope is σ (a n ) * = 0 ∀a n .
The proof of proposition 1 shows that the first-best allocation is achieved by a flat standard that is set at a level that implies that the market shadow price is equal to φ, the externality.
(All proofs are in the online appendix.) This is intuitive. The crux of our argument is that the bundling of a and e in a single durable good is largely irrelevant; the consumer's problem can be understood as a microeconomic choice problem over two related goods, a and e. The only difference is that the price of a and e can be nonlinearly related. As can be seen by the first-order conditions of the consumer's problem, equation (1), attribute-based regulation creates a pair of wedges, equal to λ and −λσ (a n ), in the "markets" for e and a, respectively. The conditions of proposition 1 imply that the planner has no distributional concerns, marginal costs are equalized across types by compliance trading, and the only market failure is the externality from e. As a result, the planner can achieve the first-best allocation by creating a wedge in the choice of e equal to the externality. There is no benefit to creating a wedge in the choice of a, which requires that σ (a n ) = 0. Where there are other market failures, this result will change, which we discuss in section IID. This is consistent with standard principles of Pigouvian taxation, which we emphasize by restating the result for a tax policy instead of a regulation in the appendix. There, we show that a 0 attribute slope is also optimal for a subsidy instead of a regulation, which accords with the broadly applicable additivity property of Pigouvian taxation.
When there is not a compliance trading system, each product must individually comply with the mandate. For a flat standard, this will give rise to dispersion in the marginal costs of compliance across products, which violates the equimarginal principle and belies inefficiency. When the attribute is correlated with compliance costs, ABR can have efficiency benefits by reducing this variation. This is shown in proposition 2: Proposition 2. Assume that there is no compliance trading. Then, even if welfare weights are uniform (θ n = 1 ∀n), the optimal linear regulation generally involves attribute basing. If the constraint binds for all n, the optimal attribute slope satisfieŝ
which is not 0 unless λ n is uncorrelated with a n .
Proposition 2 shows that absent a compliance trading system, some attribute basing is optimal even when there are no distributional considerations. The exception is when the attribute is perfectly uncorrelated with marginal compliance costs under a flat standard, in which case the numerator is 0, and attribute basing, which cannot equalize compliance costs, is undesirable. An ABR is a differentiated standard; as long as the dimension along with the standard can be differentiated is correlated with marginal cost, there is a potential efficiency gain. Attribute basing is a substitute for compliance trading, but it is an imperfect substitute for two reasons. First, whereas compliance trading can generate first-best outcomes in our framework, attribute basing can improve marginal cost equalization, but only partially, unless compliance costs are perfectly predicted by the choice of a. Second, attribute basing achieves marginal cost equalization by inducing distortions in the choice of the attribute for all types, which has an efficiency cost. In our empirical analysis, we estimate a model that allows us to directly compare the distortionary costs and the marginal cost equalization benefits.
We focus our attention on the possibility of using ABR to equalize marginal compliance because this motivation is consistent with the design of several real policies. Where this equalization is the goal, optimal policy must trade off greater equalization against larger distortions to the attribute, which we illustrate with an example in corollary 1. The corollary adds two assumptions to proposition 2-a uniform quadratic loss function and a perfect correlation between the privately optimal bundles, e 0 n and a 0 n -that together imply perfect marginal cost equalization is possible. But even when full marginal cost equalization is feasible, it is not optimal. Beginning from a flat standard, a steeper attribute slope will increase marginal cost harmonization, but it also exacerbates distortions in a (for all types). The secondbest attribute slope strikes a balance between the costs of distorting a and the benefits of marginal cost harmonization.
Real-world ABRs seem to have been designed to maximize marginal compliance cost harmonization without considering the distortions. For example, U.S. regulators chose the slope of the footprint-based standard in CAFE by fitting a line to data on fuel economy and footprint. Fuel economy standards in the EU were similarly designed by estimating the relationship between fuel economy and weight. Japanese fuel economy standards do something similar, though the slope is chosen to fit only a subset of vehicles deemed to be high performing. Fitting a line to the data in this way is consistent with an attempt to harmonize marginal costs; indeed, in the quadratic case, this is exactly the way to minimize variance in marginal costs.
But the example here shows that this is not optimal. Instead, greater harmonization should be balanced against increases in the distortion to a created by a steeper attribute slope. An ABR is a differentiated standard, and this balancing of costs and benefits will be true in other types of differentiated standards so long as (a) marginal costs are correlated with the variable that determines differentiation and (b) economic agents can strategically alter the variable that determines differentiation.
Graphical illustration.
We provide a brief graphical illustration of these conclusions in figure 1, where each dot represents the privately optimal bundle for a type, (a
The three panels of the figure represent three different policies. Vectors depict privately optimal compliance choices; that is, the end point of the vector is the new attribute bundle chosen by that type in order to comply at the lowest possible cost.
By definition, any movement away from the private optimum causes a private welfare loss. For quadratic losses, the level sets of L will be ellipses around the private optimum. Figure 1 depicts level sets for one data point. In the absence of compliance trading, the cost-minimizing way to achieve compliance for each type will be to relocate to a point where the lowest possible level set of the loss function is tangent to the regulation.
Given the quadratic loss function, the length of a compliance vector will be directly proportional to marginal cost. Marginal cost equalization is thus signified when vectors are all the same length. The slope of the privately optimal compliance vector is determined by the attribute slope. Specifically, compliance vectors will have slope (4αβ − γ 2 )/(2βσ 2 + γ) 2 , which is a function ofσ. Whenσ is 0, the compliance vector has slope (4αβ − γ 2 )/γ 2 , which may be negative or positive; that is, a might rise or fall in response to a flat standard, depending on the curvature of the loss function.
The three panels of figure 1 depict the response to a flat standard, an attribute-based standard, and a flat standard with compliance trading. In figure 1a , a flat standard generates no response (no vector depicted) among some types, because their private optimum is above the standard. For products with nonzero marginal costs, the marginal cost varies, which is indicated by the differences in vector lengths. But attribute basing also induces a change in the slope of the compliance vector. Whenσ is larger (in absolute value), the slope of the compliance vector will become flatter. That is, the proportion of the response to the ABR that comes from changes in a rather than changes in e will rise. This change in slope is inefficient, which can be seen by comparison with figure 1c, which depicts a fully efficient flat standard with compliance trading. The slopes of the vectors are the same in figures 1a and 1c; both are flat policies and induce a slope of (4αβ − γ 2 )/γ 2 . But the compliance trading system equalizes shadow prices so that all products have the same vector length.
Thus, the limitations of attribute basing are twofold. First, an ABR will only partially equalize marginal costs. Second, the ABR achieves marginal cost equalization by distorting the choice of a. As a result, as indicated by corollary 1, the second-best attribute slope will not be the one that maximizes marginal cost equalization. Instead, it will be less steep; it will trade off mitigation in the distortion to a for more dispersion in marginal cost. Of course, in reality, the loss function may differ across products, which creates another advantage for the efficient policy relative to a flat standard or an ABR.
The graphs also help illustrate a common misunderstanding in the nonacademic literature, which implies that it is desirable for an attribute-based standard to not distort the distribution of the secondary attribute relative to the nopolicy baseline. An efficient policy will induce a change in the attribute (the compliance vectors in figure 1c are not perfectly vertical), and an attribute-based policy that preserves the distribution of the attribute from a no-policy baseline is preserving a market inefficiency.
We do not formally analyze the optimal choice of which attribute to use in this paper. But it is clear that attributes that are more closely related to compliance costs and less elastic will be better. The former characteristic maximizes the ability of an ABR to harmonize compliance costs, and the latter characteristic minimizes the welfare cost of distortions to the attribute. The challenge for policymakers is finding the right attribute is twofold. First, knowledge of marginal costs will be required to estimate correlations. Second, the correlation between the attribute and marginal cost may be endogenous to the policy regime. Further exploration is a promising topic for future research.
Some real-world policies represent an intermediate case by allowing fleet averaging. A firm must comply on average across its products, but no trading is allowed between firms. Fleet averaging will harmonize the marginal costs within a firm but not across firms. Fleet averaging may achieve a substantial fraction of welfare gains. It can be thought of as a constrained form of trading in our model.
In sum, for policies that require each individual product to meet a standard rather than for the market as a whole, an ABR can increase efficiency. Minimum efficiency standards for appliances are an example of this type of policy. The first two phases of Chinese fuel economy standards were also designed this way, as is the tax subsidy for automobiles in Japan that we analyze in section IV. ABR can increase efficiency for such policies by harmonizing marginal costs, but it will do so imperfectly unless the attribute is perfectly correlated with marginal costs, and it can do so only by creating a distortion in the choice of the attribute unless that attribute is completely unresponsive to policy incentives. To the degree that the conditions are not met, ABR will be less efficient than a flat standard with compliance trading, but it may still improve over a flat standard without compliance trading. In the final section of this paper, we quantify these trade-offs for a Japanese fuel economy subsidy.
B. The Deadweight Loss of ABR
If attribute basing is employed in a policy with compliance trading (perhaps due to political constraints or simply by mistake), it will create a welfare distortion without any resulting benefit. Specifically, proposition 3 shows that for a subsidy, when the subsidy on e is set to the Pigouvian benchmark, deadweight loss is approximated by the Harberger triangle in the "market" for a, summed across types.
Proposition 3. Assume welfare weights are uniform (θ n = 1 ∀n) and s = φ. The deadweight loss from a subsidy with σ (a n ) = 0 is approximated as
The wedge in the choice of a is sσ (a n ), so this is directly analogous to a Harberger triangle. Just as in a standard setting, the magnitude of the welfare loss from using attribute basing is determined by the size of the wedge (sσ (a n )) and the derivative of the good (a) with respect to that wedge. As a is more elastic, distortions from ABR will be larger. The central object of our empirical analysis is to determine whether, for the ABR we study, this derivative is large or small, as that will determine the size of any distortion.
In the appendix, we also show that if a policy is constrained to include attribute basing, this leads to an attenuation of the second-best tax away from the Pigouvian benchmark of marginal damages, because the distortionary wedge imposed on a is mechanically related to the wedge in e.
When the attribute a is fixed and does not respond to policy, there will be no cost from a distortion in a. Even in this case, compliance trading offers an information advantage over attribute basing: the design of efficient attribute-based policies requires information about marginal costs and their correlation with the attribute.
C. Distributional Justifications for ABR
The preceding analysis assumes away distributional considerations so that the planner cares only about efficiency.
THE ECONOMICS OF ATTRIBUTE-BASED REGULATION 325
A change in the attribute slope will affect a transfer of welfare across types according to their demand for the attribute. Thus, when welfare weights are correlated with demand for the attribute across types, distributional considerations will give rise to attribute basing. Proposition 4 demonstrates this for the linear subsidy:
Proposition 4. Assume that welfare weights θ n vary. Then the optimal linear subsidy involves attribute basing unless θ n is uncorrelated with a n . The optimal attribute slope iŝ
The optimal attribute slope has two terms. The first is 0 when the subsidy is set equal to marginal damages (s = φ).
In that case, the optimal slope is the ratio of the covariance between the attribute and the welfare weight and the average derivative of a n with respect to the attribute slope. When the correlation between θ and a is positive, the optimal attribute slope is negative (because ∂a/∂σ is negative). As that correlation gets stronger, the slope becomes steeper. However, as the attribute is more elastic with respect to the policy wedge (∂a/∂σ is larger in magnitude), the optimal slope is flatter. This is because any distributional gains are achieved at the cost of distorting the choice of a for all types. When the attribute is more elastic, the efficiency costs of distribution are higher. Less redistribution is therefore optimal, and the optimal slope is flatter. When s = φ, the first term will be non-0. This term shrinks as the elasticity of the attribute, relative to the elasticity of the targeted characteristic, rises. We suspect that distributional concerns are a key explanation for the use of attribute basing in real policies. For example, it is widely held that footprint-based CAFE standards were designed in part to shift welfare toward the Detroit Three, which make larger cars than their main competitors. Similarly, French and Italian automakers (which make relatively light cars) argued in favor of a flat standard, while German automakers (whose cars are relatively heavy) argued for a weight-based standard in the EU. Any distributional gains come at an efficiency cost of distorting footprint or weight, more so as the attribute is more responsive to policy.
D. Additional Implications of Attribute Basing
Our model is focused on what we believe to be the core economic implications of attribute basing: it creates an incentive to distort the secondary attribute, which might be justified by distributional considerations or marginal cost equalization. We modeled those two justifications because we think they are the most likely explanations for actual policies. Under certain circumstances, there could be other benefits to attribute basing. These include issues related to imperfect competition, market size effects, technological change, uncertainty, consumer undervaluation of energy efficiency, and imperfect targeting of the externality. We discuss these issues, including why we think they are likely less important, in the appendix.
III. Identifying Attribute Distortions via Bunching
Our theory indicates that the pivotal determinant of the costs of attribute basing is the elasticity of the secondary attribute with respect to policy incentives. If the attribute does not change at all in response to a policy, then attribute basing will create no efficiency costs. But, a large response of the attribute signifies greater deadweight loss, as described in proposition 3. The first phase of our empirical analysis is to establish whether attribute basing does indeed distort the choice of the attribute.
We do so by analyzing the distribution of the secondary attribute for the case of Japanese fuel economy standards. The Japanese regulation has several advantages from the point of view of identification. First, the regulation features notches; the fuel economy target function in Japan is a downward-sloping step function in vehicle weight. These notches provide substantial variation in regulatory incentives and allow us to use empirical methods developed for the study of nonlinear taxation (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven & Waseem, 2013) . Second, the Japanese government has been using attribute-based regulation for decades, and we have more than ten years of data available for analysis.
A. Data and Policy Background
Japanese fuel economy standards, which were introduced in 1979 and have changed four times since, are weight based. Our data, which begin in 2001, span the two most recent policy regimes. The target functions for these policies are shown in figure 2. To be in compliance with the regulation, firms must have a sales-weighted average fuel economy that exceeds the sales-weighted average target of their vehicles,
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given their weights, and there is no trading of compliance credits across firms, although it is one of the key issues in the ongoing policy debate. In Japan, firms are required to meet this standard only in the target year of a policy.
When introducing a new standard, the Japanese government selects a set of weight categories (the widths of the steps in figure 2 ). The height of the standard is then determined by what is called the front-runner system. For each weight category, the new standard is set as a percentage improvement over the highest fuel economy vehicle (excluding vehicles with alternative power trains) currently sold in that segment. When the newest standard was introduced in 2009, the government also introduced a separate tax incentive that applies to each specific car model rather than for a corporate fleet average. We make use of this policy in our panel analysis in section IV. For our bunching analysis, we simply note that both incentives are present in the latter period, and either could be motivating strategic bunching of vehicle weight at the regulatory thresholds (which are common across the two policies).
Our data, which cover all new vehicles sold in Japan from 2001 through 2013, come from the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Tourism (MLIT). The data include each vehicle's model year, model name, manufacturer, engine type, displacement, transmission type, weight, fuel economy, fuel economy target, estimated carbon dioxide emissions, number of passengers, wheel drive type, and devices used for improving fuel economy. In the appendix, table A.1 presents summary statistics. There are between 1,100 and 1,700 different vehicle configurations sold in the Japanese automobile market each year. This includes both domestic and imported cars. The data are not sales weighted; we use the vehicle model as our unit of analysis throughout the paper.
B. Excess Bunching at Weight Notches
The notched attribute-based standards in Japan create incentives for automakers to increase vehicle weight, but only up to specific values. Increasing weight offers no regulatory benefit unless the increase passes a vehicle over a threshold. Excess mass (bunching) in the weight distribution at exactly (or slightly beyond) these thresholds is thus evidence of weight manipulation. Moreover, if automakers are able to choose vehicle weight with precision, then all manipulated vehicles will have a weight exactly at a threshold. In turn, this implies that all vehicles with weights not at a regulatory threshold have not had their weight manipulated in response to the policy.
We begin by presenting histograms of vehicle weight in figure 3. Panel A shows the histogram of cars sold between 2001 and 2008. In this period, all vehicles were subject to the old fuel economy standards, which is overlaid in the same figure. The figure reveals strong evidence of weight manipulation in response to the policy; there is visible excess mass at the notch points. The magnitude of this bunching is substantial. There are more than double the number of cars at each notch point, as compared to the surrounding weight segments. The histogram bins have a width of only 10 kilograms (the finest measure available in our data), and yet the bunching appears to be isolated to the weight categories immediately at each threshold. This suggests that automakers can manipulate weight very finely.
Panel B shows the corresponding figure for data taken from years when the new standard was in effect. Between panels A and B, the mass points shifted precisely in accordance with the change in the locations of the notch points. This shift in the location of the distributional anomalies provides further compelling evidence that firms respond to the attributed-based regulation. In the appendix, we present analogous results for kei-cars, which are microcars with engine displacements below 0.66 liters. The weight distribution of kei-cars also exhibits bunching at notch points, and the bunching moves over time in accordance with the policy change.
In sum, the raw data provide strong evidence that market actors responded to attribute-based fuel economy policies in Japan by manipulating vehicle weight, as predicted by theory. Next, we use econometric methods to estimate the magnitude of this excess bunching.
C. Estimation of Excess Bunching at Notches
Econometric estimation of excess bunching in kinked or notched schedules is relatively new in the economics literature. Saez (2010) estimates the income elasticity of taxpayers in the United States with respect to income tax rates and EITC schedules by examining excess bunching around kinks in the U.S. personal income tax schedule. Similarly, Chetty et al. (2011) estimate the income elasticity of taxpayers in Denmark with respect to income tax rates by examining the excess bunching in the kinked tax schedules there. In Pakistan, the income tax schedule has notches instead of kinks. That is, the average income tax rate is piecewise linear. Kleven and Waseem (2013) use a method similar to Chetty et al. (2011) to estimate the elasticity of income with respect to income tax rates using bunching around these notches. Our approach is closely related to these papers, although our application is a fuel economy regulation, not an income tax.
To estimate the magnitude of the excess bunching, our first step is to estimate the counterfactual distribution as if there were no bunching at the notch points, which parallels the procedure in Chetty et al. (2011) . We start by grouping cars into small-weight bins (10 kilogram bins in the application below). For bin j, we denote the number of cars in that bin by c j and the car weight by w j . For notches k = 1, . . . , K, we create dummy variables d k that equal 1 if j is at notch k. (Note that there are several bins on each step between notches, which we can denote as j ∈ (k − 1, k).) We then fit a polynomial of order S to the bin counts in the empirical distribution, excluding the data at the notches, by estimating a regression: 2
where β 0 s is an initial estimate for the polynomial fit and γ 0 k is an initial estimate for a bin fixed effect for notch k. (We refer to these as initial estimates because we will adjust them in a subsequent step.) By including a dummy for each notch, the polynomial is estimated without considering the data at the notches, defined as the 10 kilogram category starting at the notch. We define an initial estimate of the counterfactual distribution as the predicted values from this regression, omitting the contribution of the notch dummies:ĉ
s . The excess number of cars that 2 We use S = 7 for our empirical estimation below. Our estimates are not sensitive to the choice of S for the range in S ∈ [3, 11]. locate at the notch relative to this counterfactual density iŝ B
This simple calculation overestimates B k because it does not account for the fact that the additional cars at the notch come from elsewhere in the distribution. That is, this measure does not satisfy the constraint that the area under the counterfactual distribution must equal the area under the empirical distribution. To account for this problem, we must shift the counterfactual distribution upward until it satisfies this integration constraint.
The appropriate way to shift the counterfactual distribution depends on where the excess bunching comes from. Our theory indicates that attribute-based fuel economy regulation provides incentives to increase car weight-that is, excess bunching should come from the "left." We assume that this is the case. We also make the conservative assumption that the bunching observed at a given notch comes only from the adjacent step in the regulatory schedule, which limits the maximum increase in weight. That is, the bunching at notch k comes from bins j ∈ (k−1, k). In practice, automakers may increase the weight of a car so that it moves more than one weight category. In that case, our procedure will underestimate weight distortions. In this sense, our procedure provides a lower bound on weight manipulation.
In addition, estimation requires that we make some parametric assumption about the distribution of bunching. We make two such assumptions, the first of which follows Chetty et al. (2011) , who shift the affected part of the counterfactual distribution uniformly to satisfy the integration constraint. In this approach, we assume that the bunching comes uniformly from the range of j ∈ (k −1, k). We define the counterfactual distributionĉ j = q s=0βs · (w j ) s as the fitted values from the regression
whereB k = c k −ĉ k =d k is the excess number of cars at the notch implied by this counterfactual. The left-hand side of this equation implies that we shift c j by K k=1 α kj ×B k to satisfy the integration constraint. The uniform assumption implies that we assign α kj = c j
BecauseB k is a function of β s , the dependent variable in this regression depends on the estimates ofβ s . We therefore estimate this regression by iteration, recomputingB k using the estimatedβ s until we reach a fixed point. The bootstrapped standard errors that we will describe adjust for this iterative estimation procedure.
The uniform assumption may underestimate or overestimate Δw if the bunching comes disproportionately from the "left" or the "right" portion of j ∈ (k − 1, k). For example, if most of the excess mass comes from the bins near k, rather than the bins near k − 1, the uniform assumption will overestimate Δw. In practice, this appears to be a minor concern, because the empirical distribution in figure 3 shows that there 328 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS are no obvious holes in the distribution, which suggests that the uniform assumption is reasonable. However, we prefer an approach that does not impose the uniform assumption. We propose instead an approach that defines α j based on the empirical distribution of cars relative to the counterfactual distribution. We define the ratio between the counterfactual and observed distributions by θ j =ĉ j /c j for j ∈ (k − 1, k) and = 0 for j / ∈ (k−1, k). Then we define α kj =
. In this approach, α kj is obtained from the relative ratio between the counterfactual and observed distributions. We use this approach for our main estimate and report estimates from the uniform assumption approach as well.
In addition toB k (the excess number of cars at notch k), we provide two more estimates that are relevant to our welfare calculations. The first is the excess bunching as a proportion, which is defined asb = c k /ĉ k . This is the number of vehicles at a weight notch divided by the counterfactual estimate for that weight. The second estimate is the average changes in weight for cars at notch k, which is the quantity-weighted average of the estimated change in weight:
. We calculate standard errors using a parametric bootstrap procedure, which follows Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Waseem (2013) . We draw from the estimated vector of errors j in equation (5) with replacement to generate a new set of vehicle counts and follow the steps outlined above to calculate our estimates. We repeat this procedure and define our standard errors as the standard deviation of the distribution of these estimates.
Figure 4 depicts our procedure graphically for two notch points. In panel A, we plot the actual distribution and estimated counterfactual distribution at the 1,520-kilogram notch point. Graphically, our estimate of excess bunching is the difference in height between the actual and counterfactual distribution at the notch point. The estimate and standard error of the excess number of cars B is 290.0 (19.4). That is, there are 290 excess cars at this notch compared to the counterfactual distribution. Bunching as a proportion b is 3.9 (0.2), which means that the observed distribution has 3.9 times more observations than the counterfactual distribution at this notch. Finally, the average weight increase E[Δw] is 144.7 (7.2) kilograms for affected cars. Similarly, we illustrate the result at the 2020-kilogram notch point in Panel B. Table 1 presents our estimates for all notches for the data between 2001 and 2008 (the old fuel economy standard). To see the automakers' incentives at each notch, column 2 shows the stringency of the fuel economy standard (km/liter) below and above the notch (higher km/liter numbers imply more stringent standards). Columns 3 to 5 report our main estimates based on the approach we have described.
First, we find statistically significant excess bunching at all notches. Second, we find substantial heterogeneity in the estimates across the notches. The proportional excess bunching b ranges from 1.8 to 8.9. The estimated weight increases E [Δw] range between 57 and 103 kilograms for kei-cars and 59 to 156 kilograms for other cars. For most cars, this amounts to around a 10% increase in weight, which is substantial. Third, our two different approaches for approximating the counterfactual distribution (uniform or not) produce broadly similar results. Our estimates for B and b are not sensitive to the uniform assumption because the excess bunching is very large compared to the counterfactual distribution, so that the way that we reach the integration constraint matters little. We find slightly larger differences in E[Δw] between our two methods. With the uniform assumption, E[Δw] equals half the width of the regulatory weight step immediately below the notch by assumption, and therefore we have no standard errors for them. Our main estimates do not impose this assumption but nevertheless yield similar results. Note that the counterfactual distribution we estimate represents the distribution of vehicle weights that would exist if there was a flat (not attribute-based) fuel economy standard with the same shadow price. 3 To see this, consider a policy with compliance trading and two weight categories, and thus one notch, at weightã. The shadow price term in the consumer's optimization problem is equal to λ × (e n − κ 1 ) for a <ã and λ × (e n − κ 2 ) for a ≥ã, where κ 1 > κ 2 . Thus, for any a, the shadow price term is equal to λ times e n minus some constant. The marginal regulatory incentive affecting the choice of e is thus the shadow price λ, regardless of the weight category. The marginal incentive affecting the choice of a is 0 because a small change in a does not affect the shadow price term unless a =ã, in which case there is a discrete jump in the regulatory incentive. Thus, the distortions in a under the notched policy come only from the vehicles that bunch at a weight threshold, and the marginal incentives for e (= λ) and a (= 0 away from the notches) match those in a flat standard with the same shadow price λ. Table 2 presents corresponding estimates for all notches for the data between 2009 and 2013 (the new fuel economy standard period). Note that the new fuel economy standard has more, and narrower, notches. This mechanically lowers our estimates for E [Δw] , because our conservative approach assumes that automakers do not increase weight to move more than one step. Results from the second policy follow the same pattern. First, we find statistical significant excess bunching at all notches. Second, similar to the estimates in the old standard, we find substantial heterogeneity in the estimates between the notches. The proportional excess bunching b ranges between 1.6 and 4.8 for normal cars and 1.7 and 3.6 for kei-cars, depending on the notches. The estimated weight increases E [Δw] range between 33 and 88 kilograms for normal cars and 56 to 70 kilograms for kei-cars. Finally, similar to our results for the old standard, the method with the uniform assumption provides similar estimates to our main estimates.
Overall, the results in this section provide evidence that automakers respond to the attribute-based fuel economy regulation by changing the weight of vehicles. We find that about 10% of vehicles in the Japanese car market manipulated their weight to bunch at regulatory notch points. For these vehicles, the average weight increase induced by the regulation is 110 kilograms, about a 10% increase in vehicle weight. This weight increase has welfare implications, as we described in our theory, but it also has implications for safety-related externalities. Heavier vehicles are more dangerous to nonoccupants, and when this unpriced, the weight distortions we document here exacerbate safety externalities. We briefly discuss this issue in section IIID before moving on to our panel analysis.
D. Safety-Related Welfare Implications of Weight Manipulation
In the event of a traffic accident, heavier automobiles are safer for the occupants of the vehicle (this is a private benefit) but more dangerous for pedestrians or the occupants of other vehicles (this is an externality). Thus, the optimal attribute-based policy should tax vehicle size rather than subsidize it. The implicit subsidy on vehicle weight in the Japanese fuel economy standards therefore exacerbates accident-related externalities. We obtain a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the magnitude of this distortion by multiplying our estimate of the average change in car weight by an estimate of the increased probability that a heavier vehicle causes a fatality during its lifetime, times an estimate of the value of a statistical life. Specifically, the weighted average increase across all cars that bunch at the notches in table 1 is 110.20 kilograms. Anderson and Auffhammer (2014) estimate that an increase in vehicle weight of 1,000 pounds (454 kg) is associated with a 0.09 percentage point increase in the probability that the vehicle is associated with a fatality, compared to a mean probability of 0.19%. For the value of a statistical life, we use $9.3 million, which comes from a study in Japan (Kniesner & Leeth, 1991) and is within the range of standard estimates from the United States.
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Multiplying through, we calculate the welfare loss, per car sold, for a 110 kilogram weight increase, as 110 × 0.0009 × (2.2/1, 000) × $9.3 million = $2,026 per car that changes weight in response to the policy. In our data, about 10% of cars in the market are bunched. The Japanese car market sells around 5 million new cars per year, so we estimate our aggregate annual welfare distortion to be 10% of 5,000,000 times $2,026, which is $1.0 billion. Equivalently, our calculation implies that each new cohort of 5 million cars sold in Japan will be associated with an extra 103 deaths over the lifetime of those cars, which compares to an annual fatality rate of roughly 6,000. Our calculations are meant only as back-ofthe-envelope estimates, but they make clear that the welfare distortions induced by the Japanese policy are economically significant.
IV. Comparing Costs and Benefits of Attribute Basing
Our theory emphasizes that attribute basing creates welfare costs by distorting the choice of the secondary attribute. The bunching analysis in section III provides empirical evidence for this prediction. But our theory also shows that when each product must individually comply with a standard (i.e., when there is no compliance trading), an ABR may have efficiency benefits stemming from marginal cost equalization. However, even when an ABR is superior to a flat standard, it is likely to be inferior to a flat standard with trading.
The relative efficiency of the three policies (an ABR, a flat standard, and a flat standard with trading) is an empirical question because it depends on the elasticity of the attribute, as well as the degree of marginal cost equalization achieved by the ABR. Moreover, our theory suggests that ABR might provide distributional benefits even if it is inefficient. To provide empirical evidence for these predictions from our theory, we develop an empirical strategy that exploits quasiexperimental variation created by a subsidy policy in Japan.
A. A Subsidy Policy and Descriptive Evidence from Panel Data
In 2009, the Japanese government introduced a new subsidy that applied to each car model rather than the corporate average. In figure 5 , we visualize this subsidy policy. If a car had fuel economy higher than the subsidy cutoffthe lowest step function in the figure, which is equivalent to the new fuel economy standard presented in figure 2-consumers purchasing that car received a direct subsidy of approximately $700 for kei-cars and $1,000 for other cars. 4 In addition, cars with fuel economy 10% and 20% higher than the subsidy cutoff received more generous subsidies in the form of tax exemptions. This creates what we call a double-notched policy-a car had to be above a step function in the two-dimensional space of fuel economy and weight.
This policy provides two advantages in studying the costs and benefits of attribute basing. First, it created quasiexperimental variation in incentives to change weight (a) and fuel economy (e). Although all products faced the same subsidy cutoff, each had a different set of changes in a and e that would be required to get the subsidy. This variation comes from differences in starting points, from the introduction of new weight notches, and from the fact that the changes in the standards are different across the weight categories. As a result, some vehicles are able to make modest improvements in fuel economy to gain the subsidy, whereas others require large changes. And some vehicles can take advantage of a weight notch with small increases in weight, but others require a large increase. These differences create a rich source of identification for our estimation.
Second, our theory suggests that when compliance trading is not available, attribute basing creates a trade-off between distortionary costs and efficiency benefits. The model-specific subsidy indeed creates such an environment because each individual car must comply to gain the subsidy. That is, attribute basing may play a role in improving efficiency in this subsidy policy, while such benefits are likely to be minimal for the fleet-average regulation.
We begin by describing raw data that reveal how products changed in response to the subsidy. We construct panel data of 439 domestic cars by linking cars sold in 2008 (before the policy change) and 2012 (the last year of our data) based on a unique product identifier (ID) in the regulatory data. 5 Each dot in figure 5 The raw data reveal several useful results. First, many of the cars that gained the subsidy were redesigned so that 332 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS they were just above the subsidy cutoff. Second, we see that some cars had large weight increases, which is consistent with our findings in the bunching analysis. Third, most cars except for kei-cars increased both weight and fuel economy in order to gain the subsidy-that is, they moved northeast in the figure. Fourth, the attribute schedule is nearly flat in the weight distribution inhabited by kei-cars, so they are subject to a nearly flat (not attribute-based) policy. Most keicars that obtained the subsidy increased fuel economy while slightly reducing weight. This notable difference between kei-cars and other cars accords with our theory: the steepersloped portion of the standard induced substantial weight manipulation, while the flatter sloped part of the standard did not. Finally, cars that started off closer to the new standard were more likely to get the subsidy; that is, the distance to the subsidy cutoff explains most of the variation in which cars obtained the subsidy. 6
B. A Discrete Choice Model of Vehicle Redesign
To interpret these descriptive data, we develop a discrete choice model based on the theoretical framework in section II. Suppose that we observe data from a competitive market in two time periods-the first of which has no policy and the second of which features the model-specific subsidy. We consider a consumer type n who purchases a car with weight (a n ) and fuel economy (e n ). Suppose that (a 0 n , e 0 n ) is the pair of fuel economy and weight chosen in the first period. This pair should be welfare maximizing given the firm's production function and the tastes of its consumers. Any deviation from this bundle would generate private welfare loss L(Δa n , Δe n ), as presented in figure 1 .
When the subsidy policy is introduced, this product either stays at the initial optimal pair (a 0 n , e 0 n ) or moves to a new pair of (a n , e n ) that makes the product eligible for the subsidy at the lowest possible loss. Figure 5 provides two pieces of information relevant to this optimization problem. First, the loss L(Δa n , Δe n ) was likely to be larger than the subsidy's value for the cars that did not move to the subsidy cutoff. Second, for the cars that moved above the subsidy cutoff, the arrows reveal their optimal paths to comply with the requirement, which provides information about the loss function.
Based on this logic, we develop a discrete choice vehicle redesign problem. Faced with a subsidy, each product n chooses the new optimum pair of (a n , e n ). Following our notation in the theory section, we use Δa n = a n − a o n and Δe n = e n − e o n to denote product n's deviation from its initial optimum, which generates the private welfare loss L(Δa n , Δe n ).
We make two important notes on the interpretation of L(Δa n , Δe n ). First, this private welfare loss is generated by a regulation. For this reason, we can interpret L(Δa n , Δe n ) as a regulatory compliance cost. Second, we emphasize that L(Δa n , Δe n ) does not identify primitives of either the utility function or the cost function, but instead provides a reduced-form statistic that reveals the change in welfare due to the introduction of the subsidy. Note that if consumer types match perfectly to a unique vehicle and the market is perfectly competitive, then L(Δa n , Δe n ) can be interpreted directly as a change in consumer surplus. Allowing for firms to price above marginal cost does not necessarily alter this interpretation. If a markup for n does not change before and after the introduction of the subsidy, the loss function still represents changes in consumer surplus. 7 When markups change, then L(Δa n , Δe n ) may over-or understate the impact on consumers.
We describe the choice of the new optimum (a n , e n ) for product n as the outcome of a discrete choice over all of the possible (discretized) grid points in a by e space. We denote each grid point as a unique value of z. The secondperiod optimization problem for product n is to choose (a n , e n ) that maximizes W nz , which is the compliance cost plus the subsidy
We assume that the loss function is quadratic. However, we allow the parameters to flexibly vary by n through random coefficients so that L(Δa n , Δe n ) = α n (Δa n ) 2 + β n (Δe n ) 2 + γ n Δa n Δe n . τ is also a parameter to be estimated, which represents the value of receiving the subsidy, and ε nz is a type 1 extreme value error term specific to each vehicle n and each grid point z. First, we estimate equation (6) via a logit. Second, we relax the logit assumptions by allowing parameters to vary by product n via a random coefficients logit. When we interpret the parameters in terms of dollars, we rescale them by the dollar value of the subsidy by dividing byτ (Train, 2009) . We can accommodate a homogeneous trend in preferences by adding linear terms. Doing so does not change our results significantly. Table 3 presents estimates from the logit model. ΔWeight is a change in weight in 100 kilogram units and Δ(Fuel consumption) is a change in liters per 100 kilometer (l/100 km). The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, which implies that the optimal path of reducing fuel consumption should involve a reduction in weight. The first two coefficients (−0.97 and −1.16) are roughly the same, indicating that a change in weight by 100 kilograms and a change in fuel consumption by one l/100 kilometers result in approximately the same loss.
Accounting for fleet-average regulation. The simple specification in equation (6) provides transparent interpretations on the estimates of the loss function. However, it considers only the product-specific subsidy and ignores the fleet-average regulation. In the appendix, we show that the following estimating equation provides estimates of the parameters necessary to identify the loss function, taking into account the effects of the regulations:
where L(Δa n , Δe n ) = α n (Δa n ) 2 + β n (Δe n ) 2 + γ n Δa n Δe n . Compared to equation (6), this equation includes two control variables: e n − σ(a n ) is the position of the vehicle in relation to the new policy and e n − σ o (a n ) is the position of the vehicle in relation to the old policy evaluated at the new choice of a and e. In the appendix, we show that λ and λ o represent the shadow prices of the original and new fleet-average regulations, and the loss function excluding the effect of the fleet-average regulation effects
Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 show that the addition of the regulatory control variables has little impact on the coefficients on the loss function. The subsidy coefficient, however, becomes smaller in this specification. This is because we are likely to overestimate the subsidy effect in columns 1 and 2 since we do not control for the fleet-average regulation. Importantly, while the coefficient on the subsidy affects the dollar values of the loss, it does not have major impacts on the relative costs of changing e versus a because the estimates on (Δa) 2 and (Δe) 2 are robust between the two approaches.
Random coefficients models.
In columns 3 to 5 of table 3, we relax the logit assumptions by allowing random coefficients. At the bottom of the table, we report the standard deviations of normally distributed random coefficients. The mean coefficients are similar to those in the logit estimation except that the coefficients for (Δa) 2 and (Δe) 2 are slightly larger in absolute value in the random coefficients model. The standard deviations for the random coefficients are statistically significant and economically meaningful, suggesting that there is substantial heterogeneity in the parameters for the loss function. In our counterfactual policy analysis, we report results based on both the logit and the random coefficients logit to examine the policy implication of this heterogeneity.
Predicting bunching from the model. In the appendix, we demonstrate the ability of our model to predict the excess mass of vehicles located around weight thresholds in our data. Overall, we find that our parameters do a reasonable job at predicting bunching.
C. Counterfactual Policy Simulations
Using the estimated loss function, we simulate three counterfactual policies:
• ABR: This is the actual new attribute-based fuel economy standard in Japan (figure 2). We useē to denote the average improvement in fuel economy induced by this policy.
• Flat: A flat fuel economy standard that improves the average fuel economy byē. 
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The three policies are an attribute-based fuel economy standard (ABR), a flat fuel economy standard with no compliance trading (Flat), and a fully efficient policy, which is a flat standard with compliance trading (Efficient). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
• Efficient: We construct a flat fuel economy standard with compliance trading that improves the average fuel economy byē. Compliance trading equalizes the marginal compliance cost across cars, which makes this policy the most efficient to achieveē.
Letting each policy achieve the same level of an improvement in the average fuel economy (ē) makes the three policies comparable. For these counterfactual policies, we consider an energy-efficiency mandate: each product is required to comply with the standard. Our theory shows that when a policy is implemented as a mandate, attribute basing might be justified by efficiency considerations, but its efficiency depends on how large attribute distortions are and how well ABR can harmonize costs. We quantify these predictions using the loss functions in table 3. To obtain standard errors for the simulations, we create 100 bootstrapped samples, estimate the loss function for each sample, and apply that loss function to simulate counterfactuals for each sample. The standard deviation of the simulation results provides bootstrapped standard errors.
Attribute-based policy. This policy requires all vehicles in figure 5 to move above the lowest line. Given each vehicle's initial point and our estimates of the loss function L, we find a bundle of a and e that achieves compliance at the lowest possible cost. We then calculate the resulting Δa, Δe, and ΔL for each car's new optimal point.
Panel A of table 4 reports results based on the loss function with logit specification. The counterfactual ABR lowers fuel consumption e by 0.84 l/100 kilometer on average, approximately a 10% improvement in fuel economy. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, the ABR induces a 36.8 kg (81 lb) average weight increase, which is about a 3% increase in weight. This policy's private compliance cost L(Δa, Δe) is $2,132 per unit sold, averaged across all model types. An important statistic for measuring the efficiency of regulation is the standard deviation in the marginal cost of increasing e at the optimal choice across products. In the most efficient policy, this statistic is 0 because the marginal compliance cost is equalized across products. Therefore, the dispersion of the marginal compliance cost provides a measurement of inefficiency. For the ABR, this standard deviation is $1,812. Finally, we calculate the external cost from safety externalities in the last column. In addition to the private compliance cost, the ABR creates a loss from safety externalities of $677 because the policy induces an increase in weight.
Flat policy. The flat standard has the benefit of not distorting weight. The estimated γ in table 3 implies that when firms need to reduce fuel consumption e, it is helpful to reduce weight a. Consistent with this result, we observe that the flat policy reduces the average weight by 34 kilograms in table 4, an efficient change in weight rather than a distortion. The flat standard, however, creates many inframarginal vehicles-that is, vehicles that are in compliance with the standard without any change in fuel economy. These inframarginal vehicles have a 0 marginal cost of increasing e but do not change e at all because there is no regulatory incentive. Other vehicles have very large marginal costs of increasing e because they have to improve fuel economy by a large amount in order to comply with the policy. This dispersion in marginal costs is inefficient, and it results in compliance costs that are, on average, 3.73 times larger than the compliance costs of the efficient policy. To visualize this inefficiency, Figure 6 plots the distribution of marginal compliance costs across products under the ABR and the flat policy. Under the flat policy, there are many more inframarginal (zero marginal cost) observations, and the remaining distribution is also more diffuse. The benefit of attribute basing is the (partial) harmonization of these marginal costs.
Efficient policy. The ABR's harmonization in marginal compliance cost is incomplete, and that makes attribute basing an inefficient substitute for a compliance trading system. In the efficient policy, firms face a flat standard but are allowed to trade, which is equivalent to providing the efficient Pigouvian marginal subsidy for an improvement in e. This policy completely harmonizes marginal costs, no products are inframarginal, and therefore the total compliance cost is minimized. Because the standard deviation of the marginal compliance cost is 0, its distribution collapses to a constant, which we label in figure 6. Table 4 confirms that this policy achieves the policy goal by the lowest compliance cost.
Heterogeneity in compliance cost. Table 4 also shows the same statistics using the loss function that allows random coefficients. To make the results comparable to the logit estimates, we let each policy produce the same level ofē as for those estimates. The results for both estimates are qualitatively the same.
Distributional considerations. Proposition 4 in our theory suggests that attribute basing may exist in real-world policies because of its distributional implications. Attribute basing alters the incidence of compliance costs across firms and consumers, which may be desirable to policymakers. In figure 7 , we show the average compliance cost per car by firm, as estimated by our simulation. A flat standard induces uneven compliance costs across firms partly because some firms produce heavier and more fuel-inefficient cars than others. Attribute basing mitigates this dispersion by allowing heavier cars to improve less. As a result, the average compliance cost is more evenly distributed in the ABR. Finally, in the efficient policy, some firms have negative compliance costs because compliance trading allows them to sell excess compliance to others. Although the efficient policy produces the lowest compliance cost for the society by equalizing marginal compliance cost, the ABR might be preferred by policymakers if they wish to prioritize distributional considerations.
Summary. Our counterfactual analysis highlights points consistent with our theoretical predictions. First, ABR creates substantial distortions in the attribute. An efficient 336 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS policy leads to a reduction in weight, whereas the ABR causes a noticeable increase in weight. Second, a benefit of ABR is the partial harmonization of the marginal costs of compliance. Relative to a counterfactual non-ABR flat policy, ABR produces smaller dispersions of the marginal compliance costs between products, which lowers costs. Third, ABR is nevertheless an inefficient substitute for a fully efficient policy such as a non-ABR policy with compliance trading because the efficient policy does not create attribute distortions and fully equalizes the marginal costs of compliance. Fourth, ABR changes the distributional impacts of policy, so that ABR could be used as a way to favor one set of products over others.
V. Conclusion
This paper shows that attribute-based regulation is an imperfect substitute for flat policies with compliance trading. The key drawback to attribute basing is that it creates distortions in the attribute, and we show that those distortions are greater when the attribute is more responsive to policy. Empirically we demonstrate that those distortions are substantial for the case of weight-based fuel economy regulations in Japan. Attribute basing may have appeal when it is used to achieve distributional goals or when compliance trading is unavailable. Regarding the latter, for the Japanese tax policy we consider, attribute basing is significantly more efficient than a flat standard without trading, but it is twice as costly as a flat standard with compliance trading.
